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Multicultural polities and places 
One of the more remarkable things about the European Union was is the way it 
recreated its own origin myth in the 1980s.  In the face of changing global patterns of 
production, so the myth runs, it was necessary to create an economically unified and 
efficient European region by the expansion of the (then) European Communities to 
the south and the completion of the single European market.  The subplot in this 
origin myth was that the promotion of competitiveness, both within the European 
region and globally, would also create losers as well as winners within the region.  
Whether deriving from statesmanship or Paretian concepts of welfare, the myth 
recognised the need to compensate the losers within the Union in order to secure the 
political legitimacy necessary to underpin the economic unification of the region.   
 
All myths have real effects in terms of the ways that they shape human behaviour and 
understanding.  So, by the time the Union was formally born in 1991, it recognised 
that the potential losers were not only the southern member states, but were also 
scattered throughout the region in declining industrial areas and within major urban 
areas.  Thus, issues of combating social exclusion entered the European Union's 
agenda alongside its birth. 
 
One of the more curious aspects of the creation of the European Union is that it is 
explicitly being constructed as a “multicultural polity”.  With the exception of 
Belgium and Switzerland (and possibly the United Kingdom), the emergence of each 
of the member states has been rooted in a strong identification between ethnicity and 
nation state.  At the same time, migration and immigration are creating specific places 
within Europe which are ethnically highly diverse.  While the discussion of 
multicultural polities is still rooted in theories of international relations, the discussion 
of multicultural places is rooted in questions of social diversity, citizenship, ethnic 
division, hostility and racism.  In turn, these discussions of the impact of (ethnic) 
diversity seem to proceed quite separately from discussions about urban and 
neighbourhood governance even though the debates about governance are strongly 
linked to issues about urban competitiveness and competition in the context of the 
emergence of the (multicultural) European economic region and polity.   
 
This paper is part of a much larger project focused on social exclusion and urban 
neighbourhoods.  The larger project has two phases.  The first phase was a detailed 
investigation of the social dynamics within ten "socially excluded" neighbourhoods in 
eight different member states1. The second phase of the project is designed to 
investigate issues associated with neighbourhood governance and builds on the results 
of the first phase.  This paper is one of a number of pieces of work designed to 
develop the linkages between the two phases of the project.   
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   This phase, "Social Exclusion in European Neighbourhoods:  Processes, experiences and 
responses" (SOE2-CT97-3057) examined neighbourhoods in Sweden, Denmark, Germany, 
United Kingdom, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Greece and is reported in Allen, Cars and 
Madanipour (2000).  The second phase, "Neighbourhood Governance:  Capacity for social 
integration", also includes neighbourhoods in the Netherlands and will start later in 2001.  The 
phrase "socially excluded neighbourhoods" is a shorthand way of referring to those degraded 
neighbourhoods which are home to groups of people at risk of social exclusion.  Our main 
concern is with the social processes affecting residents.  Because land and housing market 
processes tend to concentrate and contain these groups in specific parts of cities, to a greater 
or lesser extent in different cities, we refer to these areas as "neighbourhoods", but 
problematising the concept of neighbourhood is central to our research aims. 
 The aim of this paper is to begin to develop a nuanced view of multiculturalism which 
can be used to analyse the problems which (ethnic) cultural diversity raises for 
governance in socially excluded neighbourhoods.  This task has some urgency for 
three reasons.  First, in all but one of the neighbourhoods in the first phase of this 
project, cultural diversity was a fact of life and strongly imbricated in local social 
dynamics2.  Second, wherever we presented the results of the first stage of our 
research to ground and policy level officials, we found considerable confusion about 
problems of ethnic division, hostility, racism and integration. In no case were officials 
able to see themselves as members of a specific (ethnic) cultural group.  Third, it is 
hardly possible to create a multicultural and supranational polity, the European Union, 
without raising issues of race and ethnicity.  While there are many ethnicities 
throughout Europe itself, they are all white.  Thus, to create a “European ethnicity” as 
a social grounding for further political union directly creates the risk of 
simultaneously institutionalising racism in the process.   
 
While it is possible to find excellent work looking at specific places, the general 
literature on ethnicity and public and/or social administration is founded on a very 
thin concept of anti-racism.  Lewis (2000) gives an excellent account of the need for a 
ground-shift from concepts of anti-racism to concepts of multiculturalism.  Parekh 
(2000), however, provides the most richly nuanced theoretical treatment of the idea of 
multiculturalism and provides the strongest basis for analysing the dynamics we 
observed in neighbourhoods across Europe.   
 
This paper proceeds in two stages.  The first stage lays out the results of our previous 
study of neighbourhoods and argues that the present situation could be characterised 
as a never-ending circle.  The second stage outlines the major components of a 
multicultural perspective and argues that such a perspective provides some useful 
guidelines for rethinking the general problems of neighbourhood governance.  
 
 
Social exclusion, neighbourhoods and regeneration 
Our research set out to document the local dynamics of social exclusion and to assess 
current "neighbourhood renewal" policies from the point of view of both residents and 
professionals working in the neighbourhoods3.  On the whole, we found that these 
localised programmes did not meet all the objectives which had been set for them 
and/or  often functioned in ways which tended to undermine social cohesion within 
the neighbourhoods.  Two different kinds of explanations can be advanced for the 
relative ineffectiveness of local programmes in terms of combating social exclusion.  
One explanation is  based on the nature of the population living in these 
neighbourhoods and the other is based on the nature of the welfare state at the end of 
the twentieth century.  Both explanations are partial and both fail to illuminate any 
strategic approach to breaking the never ending circle associated with the everyday 
experience of social exclusion. 
 
                                                 
2
   The exception was a monocultural neighbourhood in Dublin. 
3
   The "neighbourhood renewal" policies and programmes were different from neighbourhood 
to neighbourhood, ranging from complete physical renewal of the housing stock through to 
coordinated social programmes aimed at specific groups within the population. 
The people are the problem 
The first explanation for why local programmes were ineffective in combating social 
exclusion locates the "problem" in the nature of the people living in the 
neighbourhoods.  In only two or three cases, could the neighbourhoods be 
characterised (historically) as "traditional" communities, that is, tightly knit working 
class communities with strongly shared values, needs and interests, and most 
significantly, characterised by dense informal networks.  In other cases, the 
neighbourhoods had developed quite differently, as gaps in an urban fabric which 
could accommodate newcomers to the city or as newly built social housing given over 
to households meeting each other for the first time as neighbours-but-strangers.  
Nevertheless, the older and more longstanding residents tended to create a myth of the 
"good old days", when everyone knew and cared for everyone else.  In fact, eight of 
the neighbourhoods had changed very sharply over the last ten to fifteen years.   
 
Two elements of change were very distinctive.  First, the increasing significance of 
the tertiary sector as a source of jobs, affected all the neighbourhoods.  In areas of de-
industrialisation, this meant that the job based solidarities which traditionally brought 
young people into the world of work were eroded.  Other places, however, were 
characterised by a population making the leap from rural agricultural employment to 
the urban tertiary sector in a single generation.  In both situations, however, the 
pressing need was for forms of socialisation, support and skills appropriate to insecure 
and low paid employment in the commercial, personal or retail service sectors.  The 
forms of solidarity which had supported young people in the past were no longer 
available or appropriate, given the scale of structural change in the job market.   
 
The second striking area of change in seven of the ten neighbourhoods was associated 
with immigration and ethnic diversity.  Although the processes and history of 
immigration in each of these neighbourhoods was very different, the current situation 
was the same.  Two or more groups, regarding each other with mutual 
incomprehension and/or hostility, lived together within the same public and private 
spaces.  The consequence of these processes of change was that in all the 
neighbourhoods, three separate dimensions of social difference divided people along a 
single axis.  The very normal conflict between younger and older generations (which 
is part of wider processes of socialisation) was made more difficult because the 
elderly had relatively little to offer youngsters, in terms of access to job networks and 
appropriate social skills for entering new kinds of job markets.  As longstanding 
residents, elderly people felt their neighbourhoods had been invaded by newcomers, 
and furthermore, these newcomers were (ethnically) different and did not join in the 
"life of the neighbourhood" as they should.  Thus, social diversity bred division along 
the lines of generation, length of residence and/or ethnicity in all the neighbourhoods.  
The weakened (supposed) solidarities of the "good old days" could not be mended, 
extended or rebuilt across these divisions.  Despite all the diversity and hostility 
which we observed, however, the problems of youth and a responsible transition to 
adulthood formed a dominant theme in the anxieties of people living and working in 
the neighbourhoods. 
 
The welfare state is the problem 
The second line of explanation for why programmes were ineffective in combating 
social exclusion locates the "problem" in the nature of the welfare state at the end of 
the twentieth century.  In order to explain this, we developed an ideal-typical model of 
the European postwar welfare state as it had developed by around 19754.  This model 
has three key components which are relevant to understanding the effects of wider 
institutional structures on the neighbourhoods which we studied: 
 
1. Employment and the economy in general are, or will be, dominated by factory 
based mass production techniques and a set of supporting labour market 
institutional structures (eg mass trades unions, wage differentials and bargaining 
related to manual skill levels, male employment, etc).  Within this system, most 
members of the (industrialised) working force could look forward to reasonably 
steady employment and steady increases in material incomes (Lipietz 1998). 
 
2. State sponsored welfare systems support the operation of mass factory based 
economic systems.  Three elements have particular significance for the production 
of everyday life: 
 
• Educational systems were designed to meet the skills required from new 
entrants to the labour force and to act as major agents of socialisation, so 
that the experience of compulsory education provided a "cultural training", 
which helped fit children into the roles they would play in adult life. 
• General social insurance systems were designed to support workers (and 
their families) through periods of short term unemployment, illness and 
old age.  Such systems also provided, on a discretionary and/or needs 
tested basis, minimal levels of help for those unwilling or unable to enter 
the labour force.  This double system of assistance stigmatised those 
requiring discretionary and/or needs tested help and, thus, helped to 
support labour discipline. 
• Housing systems were designed to ensure that workers were well housed 
and to provide part of the package of increasing material incomes for those 
who were steadily employed. 
 
3. Political systems comprised a set of institutions centred on the (ethnically 
homogeneous) nation-state and built on the assumption that their main function 
was to manage growth and decide the allocation of fiscal resources among 
different functionally divided programmes of state activity. 
 
This model focuses on the main institutional structures which shaped everyday life in 
the neighbourhoods.  It is robust enough to allow us to distinguish the specific modes 
of operation of different kinds of welfare states throughout the member states we 
studied5.  By locating the model at a particular turning point in time, it also allowed us 
to explore different processes of economic change in the member states.  Finally, the 
model allowed us to focus on what emerged as the main concern among almost all 
those interviewed across the neighbourhoods and countries:  A generalised anxiety 
about the maintenance of basic social order.   
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   We originally labelled this a "fordist" model, reflecting its roots in the work of Alain Lipietz 
(1998).  However, this locates it too strongly within just one of a set of different explanations 
for structural change after 1975.  Since there is a high level of consensus on the main 
elements in our model among a wide variety of analysts, it is probably better just to label it the 
"European postwar model" to reflect its development between 1945 and approximately 1975.  
5
   The biggest element of differentiation was between the dualist systems in southern Europe 
and the universalist systems of Scandanavia and the United Kingdom. 
 Using the model to explain the situation in the neighbourhoods highlights three points.  
Firstly, all European economies are now, in 2001, firmly based in the tertiary sector.  
Secondly, the functionally (and professionally) divided bureaucratic machinery 
through which the postwar European welfare state operated has not changed 
substantially (cf Taylor-Gooby 1996).  It is still functionally divided and deeply 
bureaucratic.  Thirdly, the political structures for managing the delivery of "everyday 
welfare" have responded to lower rates of economic growth and structural change by 
fragmenting into systems of inter-ministerial, inter-authority and inter-departmental 
bargaining, whatever level of government is responsible for particular service delivery.  
Furthermore, the party political structures which integrated the management of the 
welfare state have disintegrated in important ways.  Vertical linkages have weakened 
so that small parts of localities, such as neighbourhoods, have more difficulty 
articulating common demands upwards.  The linkages between labour market 
institutions and leftist parties have weakened as a consequence of economic change.  
As structural change has created anxieties about "governability", processes of 
"governance" (the processes of linking disparate interest groups, stakeholders and 
organisations) have come to be as important as "government" (the management of 
departmental structures) (Pierre and Peters, 2000).  Thus, the overall pattern of change 
since 1975 can be characterised as a combination of structural economic change and 
the design of new political mechanisms coupled with the persistence of functionally 
organised, bureaucratic welfare state systems.  Elsewhere, we have called this a 
process of disjointed structural change (Allen and Cars 2000a, 2000b, 2001).   
 
This pattern of change has important consequences for the people who live in the 
neighbourhoods we studied.  Localised service delivery agencies, already fighting to 
maintain their resources within functionally divided organisational structures, were 
enjoined to join the "governance revolution" by coordinating their efforts within the 
neighbourhoods.  The theory was that coordination would, by making local spending 
more effective, compensate for reduced levels of resources.  In practice, local 
agencies were simply torn between processes of governance, that is, devoting 
resources to developing and establishing mechanisms of local coordination with other 
agencies, actors and stakeholders, on the one hand, and processes of government on 
the other hand, that is, fighting to maintain the existing level resources coming to 
them within their own vertically structured departmental processes.   
 
The changes we observed in the neighbourhoods are part of a wider set of urban 
changes.  Elsewhere, Elander and Blanc (2000) have pointed out that urban 
fragmentation and widening socio-economic disparities have eroded the role of local 
government as the leading policy maker. Stoker (2000) notes that the relevant actors 
for tackling any specific problem are now found spread across the public, private and 
voluntary sectors, creating immense problems of coordination within the public sector.  
These patterns create the need for new types of political skills and resources, capable 
of coordinating activities both across different sectors of government who have shared 
responsibility, and where responsibility is shared between public and private actors.  
As a minimum, it is necessary to ensure that different actors do not obstruct each 
other.  The aim of ensuring that public actors and private partners share the same 
objectives is yet more difficult to achieve (Pierre 2000).  The consequence is that 
public agencies are torn with tensions as they try to combine their traditional role as 
service providers with a desire to enhance their role by working with other partners 
and providing local leadership (Burgess et al 2001). 
 
In the programmes in the neighbourhoods we studied, the tension between governance 
and government was expressed in terms of developing new forms of local 
accountability and transparency, alongside traditional methods of accountability 
upwards within bureaucratic structures.  Local accountabilities to residents were, in 
theory, the natural complement of local coordination.  In practice, the demand for 
local accountability, made from above, enhanced the conflict for agencies between 
facing upwards within existing structures and facing outwards towards other local 
agencies and actors.   
 
As a consequence, local accountability mechanisms tended to lead to consultative 
and/or participative forums which were very weak for four  reasons.   
 
• Firstly, they tended to draw on those residents who were already most concerned 
about matters in the neighbourhoods, that is the elder and long established 
residents, excluding the newer and younger groups who had come to the areas 
more recently.  Ironically, this approach tended to undermine the legitimacy of 
those residents who did become involved since their "representativeness" was 
easily questioned.  In this context, in most neighbourhoods, locally elected 
politicians were conspicuous mainly by their absence, so that resident 
representatives were implicitly expected to bear the weight of "political 
legitimacy" no matter how they were selected or elected.  
• Secondly, these forums were established in the context of intense 
interdepartmental bargaining behind the scenes.  Thus, while their existence was 
necessary for each of the agencies, no single agency had a specific interest in 
developing and supporting these forums in ways which would allow them to 
articulate effective demands which would change the pattern of (vertically divided) 
resource allocations to the neighbourhoods.   
• Thirdly, for each agency, maintaining the opacity of its structures was more 
important than transparency to residents since transparency to residents was also 
transparency to other agencies and a source of vulnerability in inter-departmental 
bargaining for resources.  For each agency, the important struggles were "with 
other agencies" located in other departments, not "for residents" living in the 
neighbourhood.  The effect was to enhance residents' feelings of powerlessness 
vis-à-vis the larger structures delivering services to the area, creating a situation in 
which all local professionals working in the area were identified with a faceless 
"them".  At the same time, these processes introduced a further local status 
division (based on personal knowledge of local bureaucrats) which enhanced 
divisions within the neighbourhoods.  This further delegitimised resident 
representatives, since they were, in practice, unable to "deliver" much to the 
neighbourhood and, at the same time, subject to the envy or distrust of other 
residents due to their enhanced status locally.   
• Fourthly, the only reasonably stable inter-agency view of residents in such 
circumstances tends to be that they are a relatively homogeneous group 
characterised by "multiple disadvantage".  To privilege or prioritise any particular 
demand from residents is to simultaneously privilege specific agencies and social 
groupings within the neighbourhood.  Consequently, it becomes very difficult for 
inter-agency coordinating mechanisms to recognise the significant elements of 
social and cultural diversity within the neighbourhoods.   
 
The introduction of special funding schemes designed to "renew" these 
neighbourhoods often exacerbated these problems.   Such schemes change the balance 
of power among local agencies, often in unpredictable ways and/or in ways unrelated 
to any analysis of local social dynamics, enhancing agencies' tendencies to dig in and 
fight their own corners.  Where the schemes involve substantial capital investment, 
they often disrupt daily life for residents.  The dynamics of ensuring that large scale 
capital investment is spent efficiently are, in any case, unrelated to the much slower 
and more diffuse dynamics of establishing local forums and coordinating mechanisms 
(cf Taylor 2000).  Parachuted in, these schemes enhance all residents' sense of 
powerlessness.  They illustrate very clearly the paradox of the late twentieth century 
welfare state:  It delivers services hand in hand with powerlessness. 
 
These comments present a very bleak picture.  They need to be qualified in three  
ways.  Firstly, where resources were directly available to and controlled by groups of 
residents, for example, through community work initiatives, residents experienced an 
enhanced sense of power based in their own capacities.  Secondly, there was one 
initiative, which enjoyed exceptionally powerful political support within the local 
authority, and so was able to operate in a manner which recognised diversity among 
residents and was designed to enhance residents' capacities in the course of a massive 
resettlement programme.  Thirdly, there were a number of very successful, usually 
small scale initiatives which focused very sharply on specific groups and which were 
characterised by exceptional professional leadership.  In other words, overcoming the 
tendencies inherent in welfare state structures required identifying and delivering 
strategic resources, either workers committed to and controlled by residents, or 
significant political support, or professional leadership. 
 
In conclusion, what is clear from this second line of explanation is that solutions 
which rely on the existing structure of agencies within a neighbourhood, while forcing 
them to coordinate their activities and develop consultative forums, are likely to be 
self-defeating.   
 
Disjointed structural change 
Neither of these two explanations, one locating the "problem" in the people who live 
in the neighbourhoods and the other locating the "problem" in welfare state structures, 
shows how the neighbourhoods have been created by disjointed structural change.  
Basic economic structures have changed, altering the employment possibilities for 
people living in these neighbourhoods6.   Political structures and processes are 
changing at formal levels to emphasise the skills of governance over those of 
governing.  Although concepts of "democratic representation" are still potent, elected 
politicians are more preoccupied with the governability of whole urban areas than 
with governance within the neighbourhoods.  However, alongside these changing 
economic and political structures, welfare state structures have changed relatively 
little.  The overall welfare state structures are still functionally and professionally 
divided, designed to deliver goods and services to specific client groups.  The whole 
                                                 
6
   Although this simple observation doesn't do justice to the significant proportions of people 
living in most of these neighbourhoods who are dependent on social insurance and/or social 
benefits for part or all of their income and who are effectively outside the labour force. 
structure, economic, welfare state and political, has become disjointed.  The overall 
effect is that the imposition of neighbourhood based coordinating and governance 
mechanisms within the current structural configuration creates a set of processes 
which could be characterised as a never-ending circle of ineffectiveness.   
 
 
A new vision of neighbourhood governance 
There are two types of solutions to the problems outlined above.  One is to consider 
what types of resources are necessary to create a virtuous spiral out of a never-ending 
circle of ineffectiveness.  This can certainly be effective in particular  circumstances, 
but there is no guarantee such circumstances will occur everywhere or, even, where 
they do occur, they can be sustained.  Burgess et al (2001) give an excellent review of 
the elements which explain reluctance to change:  Motivational (mistrust), 
organisational (lack of resources and impenetrable bureaucracies), institutional 
(complex procedures to access funding), political and cultural barriers (unfavourable 
labelling) and economic (excessive time and costs of active engagement by residents).  
Their review suggests that, at best, never ending circles can only be converted into a 
slightly different shape, such as a never ending ellipse.   
 
The second type of solution is to recast the problem by formulating a strategic vision 
within which the disparate resources available to and within neighbourhoods can be 
used more effectively.  Along these lines, Taylor (2000) suggests that it is necessary 
to find ways around the system in order to generate real change.  We argue that it is 
more a problem of breaking out of the system than finding ways around it.  In other 
words, formulating the problem of combating social exclusion as one of "effective 
resident participation in the delivery of services" simply leads to solutions which 
reproduce the problem.  What is necessary is to look for a new way to formulate the 
problem.  Elsewhere, we have referred to this as a problem of creating effective 
micro-political processes and structures within neighbourhoods (Allen and Cars 
2000a).  What we are searching for is approaches to understanding the problem which 
are rooted in the social dynamics among residents, rather than in the dynamics of 
inter-agency service delivery.  In the remainder of this paper, we discuss a key part of 
creating micro-political processes, which is creating the social infrastructure of 
cohesion within neighbourhoods.  We see this as a key part of the problem, given the 
tendency we observed for processes of "resident participation in service delivery" to 
contribute to social fragmentation, rather than to social cohesion among residents. 
 
We take inspiration in this task from three sources.  One is Healey's definition of 
planning as "managing a shared existence in space" (1997).  Building on this 
perspective, Healey suggests that formal institutions provide a 'hard' institutional 
infrastructure in neighbourhoods, which needs to be combined with a 'soft' 
infrastructure of relationship building so that sufficient consensus and mutual learning 
can occur to develop the social, intellectual and political capital required to manage a 
shared existence in space.  Our analysis of the social and institutional dynamics in the 
neighbourhoods we studied suggests that the problem lay in a hard infrastructure 
which inhibited the formation of soft infrastructures. 
 
The second source of inspiration is LeGales' (1998) definition of urban governance, 
which can be adapted to neighbourhoods.  He defines governance as: 
 
• The capacity to form a collective actor from diverse local interests, organisations 
and social groups and with sufficient internal integration to be able to formulate 
collective goals 
• The ability to represent the 'local collective actor' to the market, other parts of the 
city and various levels of government. 
 
Along these lines, Amin and Thrift argue that successful local governance depends on 
an "institutional thickness" characterised by four factors:  a plethora of civil 
organisations, a high level of social interaction among different social groups, 
coalitions crossing individual interests and a strong sense of common purpose (1995).  
There was clearly the potential to generate institutional thickness in the 
neighbourhoods we studied, given their social diversity, but existing local social 
dynamics tended to generate division, rather than integration, out of this diversity.  
This inhibited the formation of the kinds of networks linking diverse groups which 
could underpin developing the mutual trust, learning and reciprocity basic to creating 
Healy's soft infrastructure or Amin and Thrift's institutional thickness. 
 
The third source of inspiration derives from the neighbourhoods themselves and, in 
particular, their cultural diversity.  It is difficult to escape the observation that while 
we were looking at European neighbourhoods, a significant proportion of the people 
we saw were not (ethnically) European7.  Furthermore, in several neighbourhoods it 
was clear that “non-European” groups had a sophistication and cosmopolitan outlook 
which served as an important resource in devising everyday living strategies in 
difficult material and often hostile social circumstances.  It would be fair to say that 
these groups often possessed higher levels of certain kinds of social capital than many 
of the “European” residents.  
 
Granovetter argues that economic and administrative actions are embedded in social 
relations (1985).  However, it was clear in the neighbourhoods that the social relations 
which conditioned administrative and institutional actions were distinctly 
monocultural – rooted in the dominant or host culture.  Cultural diversity was seen by 
administrators as a problem, because people did not behave as expected, rather than as 
a potential source of ideas for re-solving the issues which arise in the course of 
managing a shared existence in space.   
 
These considerations of multiculturalism raise two distinct questions.  On the one 
hand, how can multicultural resources be harnessed as a strategic resource for 
neighbourhood governance?  On the other hand, how does attempting to do this lead 
us to rethink approaches to developing effective neighbourhood governance?  In order 
to begin to answer these questions, we have turned to Parekh's recent work on the 




Does a fish know it’s swimming in water?  Cultural diversity and 
multiculturalism 
                                                 
7
   Although, in most cases, they were either European citizens or had rights of permanent 
residence. 
Parekh’s work has been designed to get beyond the implicit assumptions about 
ethnicity which underlie the development of European political theory and institutions.  
His intellectual strategy is designed to problematise the specific preconceptions which 
any cultural group brings to its political practices and, thus, to open the door to 
considering other kinds of practices.  It is for this reason that we believe his work is 
helpful in reconceptualising the nature of neighbourhood governance as one of the 
significant sites within the emerging European polity where cultural diversity is 
highly relevant.  The beginning point for Parekh’s work is, thus, a definition of 
culture as: 
 
A historically created system of meaning and significance, 
or . .  . a system of beliefs and practices in terms of which a 
group of human beings understand, regulate and structure 
their individual and collective lives.  It is a way of 
understanding and organising human life.  The understanding 
it seeks has a practical thrust . . . and the way it organises 
human life is not ad hoc and instrumental but grounded in a 
particular manner of conceptualising and understanding it 
(Parekh 2000, 143). 
 
The problem this creates for governmental and governance arrangements is that: 
 
By definition a multicultural society consists of several 
cultures or cultural communities with their own distinct 
systems of meaning and significance and views on man and 
the world.  It cannot therefore be adequately theorised from 
within the conceptual framework of any particular political 
doctrine which, being embedded in, and structurally biased 
towards, a particular cultural perspective, cannot do justice to 
others (Parekh 2000, 13). 
 
For this reason, "a multicultural society faces two conflicting demands and needs to 
devise a political structure that enables it to reconcile them in a just and collectively 
acceptable manner".  On the one hand, it needs to "foster a strong sense of unity and 
common belonging among its citizens, as otherwise it cannot act as a united 
community able to take . . . collectively binding decisions and regulate and resolve 
conflicts" (196).  On the other hand, it "cannot ignore the demands of diversity . . .  
Diversity is an inescapable fact of its collective life" (Parekh 2000, 196). 
 
Parekh's views echo much of the literature on urban governance and in particular, 
LeGales’ definition of the collective actor.  But the difference between his vision of 
diversity and that which underlies the governance literature is that Parekh does not 
assume the legitimacy or adequacy of the norms of political behaviour, structure and 
processes which characterise the dominant cultural group.  Rather, he argues that 
"multiculturalism is about the proper terms of relationship between different cultural 
communities.  The norms governing their respective claims . . . cannot be derived 
from one culture alone but through and open and equal dialogue between them" 
(Parekh 2000, 13).  Thus, his view implies that effective and acceptable 
neighbourhood governance structures need to be designed from the bottom up by the 
specific groups involved in an area and not imposed from the top down as a condition 
of the operation of agencies within the area.  Structures imposed from the top down 
tend to derive from the monocultural political assumptions of the host culture and thus, 
privilege the participation of members of the host culture living in the neighbourhood.  
For this reason, top down type structures, that is, structures rooted in inter-agency 
dynamics, can intensify cross-cultural tensions8.   
 
In saying this, it is important to understand that Parekh's exploration of the possibility 
of multiculturalism is rooted in his study of societies characterised by very deep 
tensions and conflicts among different cultural groups eg Israelis and Palestinians, 
Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs in the Indian subcontinent.  In such circumstances, the 
capture of state or governmental organisations by one of the groups threatens other 
groups.  Even in situations which are not characterised by overt conflict, mutual 
incomprehension can breed mistrust and a feeling of threat 
 
Consequently,  Parekh's vision of multiculturalism is necessarily  dynamic.  
Multiculturalism emerges from the way that "cultures constantly encounter one 
another both formally and informally and in private and public spaces.  Guided by 
curiosity, incomprehension or admiration, they interrogate each other, challenge each 
other's assumptions, consciously or unconsciously borrow from each other, widen 
their horizons and undergo small and large changes" (Parekh 2000, 220).   
 
Thus, the hallmarks of a multicultural society are that each culture has 
incorporated some elements of the other(s) and acquired a multicultural 
dimension, while at the same time new, multiculturally constituted phenomena 
emerge, "imaginatively transforming the elements borrowed from different 
traditions into something wholly different" (Parekh 2000, 220).   The two 
processes, multiculturalisation of existing traditions and the emergence of 
multiculturally constituted new ones, are closely related to and reinforce each 
other.  Like all processes of cultural change, the growth of multiculturalism is 
unplanned, open-ended, multi-stranded, pulls in different directions and is 
constantly in the making.  Because Parekh's understanding of what multi-
culturalism can be is built on a model of societies characterised by severe 
conflict, the central normative element in his theory derives from a belief that 
such tensions can only be resolved by recognising their very deep roots in the 
differences between cultures.  It is a fundamental element of this perspective 
to see the beliefs and practices of a host and/or dominant culture as 
analytically on a par with the beliefs and practices of other cultural groupings. 
 
The dynamic, continually evolving nature of multiculturalism suggests that the 
problem of designing governance structures and processes needs to be conceived of as 
a process within which different structures become appropriate at different points in 
time.  The problem is not one of searching for a "single best structure" valid for all 
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   Some everyday examples will help illustrate this.  Europeans assume that the chairperson 
for a meeting derives his/her legitimacy from election, not from "age" or "wisdom" or "skill in 
resolving conflicts".  Another assumption is that disagreements can, and sometimes should, 
be finally resolved by voting among the members of the meeting, not by continuing the 
discussion until a mutually satisfactory solution is arrived at or, alternatively, be arbitrated by 
the eldest and wisest person in the group.  Again, there is a clear presumption that during 
meetings, individuals should speak in turn to the whole meeting, rather than taking time within 
meetings for people to discuss matters more generally among themselves.   
points in time, but one of a process of thinking through and negotiating changes in 
governance structures as the multicultural social and institutional capacities of people 
living and working in the neighbourhoods develops.   
 
Parekh’s treatment of multiculturalism contains two additional elements which are 
significant for creating a vision of neighbourhood governance:  the way 
multiculturalism is supported by decentralisation of power, and the way that private 
and public realms interact. 
 
Parekh argues that: 
 
Decentralisation of power has a particularly important role to 
play in ensuring justice in multicultural societies.  Since 
different communities regularly encounter each other in the 
normal course of life at local or regional levels, respect for 
their differences at these levels matters to them greatly and 
shapes their perceptions of each other and the state.  It is 
also easier for the local and regional bodies to accommodate 
differences than it is for the central government, because the 
adjustment required is more readily identified, limited in scale, 
not too costly and is generally free from the glare of publicity.  
There is also greater room for experimentation, mistakes are 
more easily corrected, and different areas can learn from 
each other's good practices (Parekh 2000, 212). 
 
While Parekh's main concern is with the formal institutions of government, his 
insights apply with even more force to neighbourhood management.  However, his 
ideas conflict with deeply institutionalised ideas about accountability in local 
government.  In particular, they suggest the need to develop much more expertise in 
thinking through criteria for identifying acceptable "outcomes" rather than the 
"output" oriented exercise of accountability which is more common.  More precisely, 
if local governments are to support the kind of experimentation and dynamic 
evolution of neighbourhood governance which seems necessary to support the 
emergence of multiculturalism, then leaving these emerging governance structures 
free to define local projects, aspirations, needs, etc is a way of leaving neighbourhood 
micro-political spaces open to develop.  The ability to negotiate the definition of 
"outputs" among different cultural groups within a neighbourhood is itself the single 
most important "output" of multicultural neighbourhood governance.  Thus, the 
desired "outcome" needs to be defined in terms of well-functioning multicultural 
neighbourhood governance mechanisms, and sophisticated criteria for assessing 
movement towards such mechanisms need to be developed.  If neighbourhood 
governance mechanisms are held to be accountable simply for the delivery of specific 
"outputs", delivering the "beans to be counted" in Power's metaphor (1997), then this 
kind of accountability interferes with developing the multicultural negotiating skills 
which are fundamental to the desired outcome. 
 
Parekh also argues that it is especially important for local and regional government to 
foster a vibrant civic culture because "intercommunal tensions are less frequent and 
more easily managed when there is an extensive local network of formal and informal 
cross-communal linkages nurturing the vital social capital of mutual trust and 
cooperation" (Parekh 2000, 212).  A flourishing civil society is important because it 
creates numerous opportunities for members of different cultural communities to meet 
and pursue common cultural, economic and other interests on a regular and relaxed 
basis.  As people become used to each other, cross-cultural understanding and trust 
are built up, including the skills to negotiate and live with unresolved differences.  
The bonds of cross-cultural friendships and common material interests make the 
burdens of the occasional incomprehension and irritation "inherent in most 
intercultural encounters" (Parekh 2000, 222) easier to bear.   
 
This suggests that financial, practical and moral support for a wide range of groups to 
"do things themselves" is a necessary pre-condition for designing effective 
multicultural neighbourhood governance mechanisms.  Funding programmes, in 
particular, but also other forms of practical support can be designed to encourage 
multicultural interaction and to draw on, draw out and strengthen the social capacity 
of the individuals and groups involved.  What is equally, if not more, important are 
the implications for developing institutional capacities:  To manage such programmes, 
to learn what community interests and priorities are from the demands on these 
programmes, and to tolerate service provision from voluntary groups outside the 
welfare state institutions.  This argument also supports the emphasis on learning how 
to assess the outcome of a well functioning multicultural neighbourhood governance 
mechanism since supporting funding programmes of this nature is, effectively, 
recognising the ability of different groups to define those outputs which they desire.  
One of the crucial institutional capacities which is required at local (or regional or 
central) government level is managing funding programmes of this nature in a way 
which supports the development of multicultural governance rather than undermining 
it by generating intergroup rivalries. 
 
Parekh also argues that the public realm is important in supporting a multicultural 
civil society by providing a public welcome to the presence and contributions of 
different cultures, patronising social and other events, and seeking ways to 
incorporate different cultural contributions into the 'high culture' of the society and 
throughout all its institutional spaces.  However, the public realm is also the realm of 
political activity – the governance of the society – and a monocultural public political 
realm can undermine and inhibit the emergence of multiculturalism in the private 
realm9.  The conduct and content of political activity needs to recognise that 
established political language, standard accents, and prevailing political values can 
discourage the participation of those unused or unsympathetic to them.  In the 
political realm, there is a need to: 
 
Welcome new conceptual languages, modes of deliberation, 
forms of speech and political sensibilities, and create 
conditions in which their creative interplay could over time 
lead to a plural public realm and a broadbased political culture.  
Even established political values should not be treated as 
non-negotiable.  If they can be shown to be unfairly biased 
against certain cultures or to exclude other equally worthwhile 
political values, a critical dialogue on them should be 
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   Parekh's concept of "private realm" is more extensive than the usual concept of "civil 
society".  He uses the concept of private realm to refer to those aspects of personal and 
family life which are not usually included in the idea of civil society. 
welcomed as a step towards a richer moral culture enjoying a 
broad cross-cultural consensus (Parekh 2000, 223). 
 
Much of the literature on neighbourhood governance focuses on the locality itself.  
Parekh reminds us that the nature of the wider public realm is also important in 
supporting locality based governance.  Proactive anti-racism policies, forms of 
positive action, and so forth are essential supports to locality based initiatives, just as 
locality based initiatives can serve as experimental sites for developing and refining 
these broader policies and actions.   
 
In conclusion, it is possible to use Parekh’s work to develop a critique of the literature 
on urban and neighbourhood governance.  The easiest way to summarise the effect of 
this critique is by articulating a number of “principles for designing neighbourhood 
governance”. 
 
• Neighbourhood governance mechanisms must be designed from the bottom up in 
order to take account of the specific cultural groups living and working in the 
area.  The problems of conflict resolution are specific to the configuration of 
cultural groups in the area – different configurations can be expected to lead to 
different problems and methods of conflict resolution.  The implication of this 
point is that there is no one specific model of neighbourhood governance which 
can be said to be “best”.  Rather, there are only models which fit the 
configuration of groups who are to be involved in them.  This is a positive 
observation.  On the one hand, it gives us a way of understanding why some 
neighbourhood governance mechanisms are so easily exclusive.  On the other 
hand, the shoe fits both feet.  It is necessary to look at governance mechanisms 
from the point of view of each of the cultural groups in the area (including the 
host group as a specific cultural group) to identify the sources of mutual 
incomprehension and irritation.   
• The second point is an extension of the first.  Governance arrangements should be 
expected to evolve over time.  What may work at the moment of first contact may 
become outmoded as multicultural understandings develop and mature.  
Particular formal safeguards for the position and interests of specific groups may 
become unnecessary as other groups begin to internalise an understanding of the 
group and the interaction between groups imaginatively transforms elements from 
different traditions into something new.  This general theme, of the evolution of 
governance mechanisms, is underdeveloped in the governance literature in any 
case, reflecting the short run nature of many programmes.  Parekh’s work gives 
the problem both a new twist and a new urgency. 
• Outcome is more important than output in assessing the adequacy of 
neighbourhood governance mechanisms.  Frequently, central government based  
neighbourhood renewal programmes allow considerable choice to local initiatives 
in terms of defining “output measures”  However, once these measures are 
selected, they become the basis for an “upward facing accountability”, and in this 
way, they displace consideration of the considerably more difficult political 
question of how local accountabilities are exercised.  This point becomes 
especially important in the context of neighbourhood governance mechanisms 
which are tailor made to the configuration of cultural groups within the 
neighbourhood and which may be evolving in nature as multicultural mechanisms 
and understanding develop.  This point is especially important because the 
development of multicultural governance mechanisms requires the institutional 
space for experimentation, for learning from mistakes and for learning from each 
other.  Focusing on output rather than outcome closes up these institutional 
spaces. 
• New kinds of strategic and practical institutional capacities are needed to support 
multicultural neighbourhood governance.  In some places, “simply” enhancing 
multicultural sensitivity would be an advance, requiring considerable leadership 
throughout wider governmental and governance systems.  In other places, 
practical capacities to foster a wide variety of local groups, pursuing their own 
aims and finding places to interact, are required.  At the same time, these 
orientations and capacities need to be supported throughout the public realm.  
This is not a chicken and egg problem, but rather one of being committed to 
starting and maintaining a process to the point at which it becomes 
institutionalised as “second nature” to local actors, one where the absence of 
multicultural actors begins to be seen as something strange and requiring 
explanation.  Moreover, the dynamic nature of multicultural phenomena means 
that the development of these capacities is not a once and for all activity, but is, 
rather, a mode of thinking and acting which can respond to continually changing 
multicultural relationships.  Of particular importance in developing these wider 
institutional capacities is the ability to distinguish when intergroup dynamics are 
regressing, and developing skills of knowing when and how to step into such 
situations. 
• Finally, much of the neighbourhood governance literature is premised on the 
ideas that “conflicts should be resolved” and “problems should be solved”.  
However, Parekh makes the point very strongly that the question is one of being 
able to distinguish between those conflicts which need to be resolved to promote 
multicultural governance and those conflicts with which we can all live.  This 
point is very important.  Parekh's vision of multiculturalism rests as much on 
learning to tolerate, even welcome, difference as it does on negotiating the 
resolution of intergroup conflicts.  The promise of Parekh’s work in thinking 
about multicultural phenomena in designing neighbourhood governance 
mechanisms is that multiculturalism should, in the best circumstances, yield new 
ways to approach old conflicts and problems and, at the same time, help in 
distinguishing between those conflicts which have real consequences and those 
which arise from the 'irritation of incomprehension'.   
 
All these points suggest that criteria for assessing the success of neighbourhood 
governance arrangements in multicultural neighbourhoods can be formulated in terms 
of the development of multicultural institutions.   In formulating the conclusions in 
this way, they echo at the local level what we expect at the European regional level – 
that institutions will evolve and change over time, that they need to satisfy all the 
participants, that complex package deals are more successful than single issue 
decisions, and that the pace of change will vary from time to time.   
 
 
Conclusions:  Building the social infrastructure of cohesion 
 
The aim of this paper was to develop a view of multiculturalism which could be used 
to analyse the problems which cultural diversity raises for governance in socially 
excluded neighbourhoods.  The first half of the paper summarises the results of a 
detailed study of the social dynamics of ten socially excluded neighbourhoods within 
eight of the European member states.  This summary links local social and 
institutional dynamics with an analysis of a process of disjointed structural change 
across Europe over the last quarter century.  As a consequence of the way local 
situations and structural change are interwoven, programmes of social and/or physical 
renewal within these neighbourhoods, linked with attempts to enhance local 
coordination and create mechanisms of neighbourhood governance, tend to create a 
never ending circle of ineffectiveness and powerlessness.  This analysis indicates a 
clear need for new ideas about neighbourhood governance.  
 
The second half of the paper was spurred by the observation that the neighbourhoods 
were generally characterised by high levels of (ethnic) cultural diversity while the 
existing literature on -- and practices of -- neighbourhood governance are deeply 
rooted in mainstream European political practices. Parekh’s recent work on the 
political theory of multiculturalism offered a way of looking at intergroup 
relationships which is relevant to understanding issues of ethnic exclusion within the 
neighbourhoods (and ethnic occlusion in the literature).   
 
More unexpectedly, however, using Parekh’s multicultural theory yielded a number of 
critical insights into ways of thinking about neighbourhood governance more 
generally.  It seems that the deep rooting of existing ideas and practices of  
governance in western European political theory and practice leads to a kind of 
premature specificity in neighbourhood governance practices. The general force of the 
analysis in the second half of the paper identified a number of strategic criteria 
relevant to thinking about how to design practices of neighbourhood governance in 
specific situations:  the need to design governance mechanisms which are relevant to 
the specific actors concerned, which are capable of evolving over time as 
relationships among actors develop, which allow for the creation of local 
accountabilities and allow learning from experience, and which require new kinds of 
social and institutional capacities both locally and in the wider political context.  In 
summary, the analysis highlighted the kinds of social infrastructures necessary to 
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